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INTRODUCTION
The legal debate over state sovereign immunity has persisted
practically since the founding.1 Under the sovereign immunity doctrine,
†
J.D., 2010, University of Richmond School of Law, B.A. Washington and Lee
University. Once again, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor John Paul Jones
for all of his guidance in writing this article. I also thank Thomas and Annette Gates and
Elizabeth Martin for their love and support.
1
See generally Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also Alfred
Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (2001)
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states cannot be sued without their consent even for violations of the
Constitution or federal law.2 Sovereign immunity, thus, kindles the
lasting tension between the supposed supremacy of federal law and the
separate sovereignty of the states.3 Since its initial recognition of state
sovereign immunity in Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court has
recognized several exceptions to the doctrine designed to secure state
compliance with federal law.4 One such exception is the Ex Parte Young
doctrine. In Ex Parte Young, the Court announced that individual state
citizens could bring suit against state officers in federal court for an
ongoing violation of federal law.5 As discussed further below, the Court
based this exception on the legal fiction that a suit against a state officer
in violation of federal law is not a suit against the state at all, but rather, a
suit against a rogue state officer stripped of his authority.6 The Ex Parte
Young exception has survived subject only to some refinement. In recent
decades, however, the Supreme Court has vastly expanded the bar of
sovereign immunity as an integral part of the “federalist revival” begun
by the Rehnquist Court.7 As explored in further detail below, the Court
recently has incorporated the “anti-commandeering” principles from
parallel federalism cases into its sovereign immunity jurisprudence,
resulting in a significant narrowing of federal judicial power to hear
claims against the states. Against this backdrop, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a novel issue of sovereign
immunity with major implications for administrative law.
In Virginia v. Reinhard, the Fourth Circuit confronted a question
of first impression about the applicability of the Ex Parte Young
exception.
That case presented the issue of whether a state
administrative agency could bring suit in federal court against another

(describing the overwhelming hostility toward sovereign immunity in the academic
community).
2
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890). After the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alden v. Maine, the doctrine of sovereign immunity encompasses states’ immunity from
suit in its own courts without the consent of its legislature as well as the more
traditionally recognized immunity from suit in federal court and the courts of other states.
Because Virginia v. Reinhard involved a state’s immunity from suit in federal court,
sovereign immunity, as the term is used in this paper, refers to a state’s immunity from
suit in federal court without its consent.
3
See Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of
the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L. J. 1167, 1178–79 (2003).
4
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
5
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)
6
See id. at 160.
7
See generally Ernest Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure,
41 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1601 (2000).
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state agency to secure its compliance with federal law.8 In holding that
the agency could not bring suit under Ex Parte Young, the Court of
Appeals issued a decision with major implications for administrative law
and how state agencies may enforce state compliance with federal
regulatory schemes. This article examines and explicates the basis of the
court’s decision in Reinhard and considers the decision’s consequences.
The Court of Appeals’ rationale goes to the most fundamental principles
and structure of the system of dual federalism. Part II begins by
examining the Reinhard decision. Examination of both the district
court’s decision and the Fourth Circuit’s decision proves helpful in fully
understanding the rationale. As shown, the Fourth Circuit drew
primarily from recent Supreme Court authority incorporating principles
of political accountability and protection of special sovereignty interests
into the sovereign immunity doctrine. For this reason, an examination of
the Supreme Court’s major sovereign immunity decisions is crucial to
understanding Reinhard. Part III develops the Supreme Court’s
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. It begins by recounting the origins of
sovereign immunity and proceeds to trace the Supreme Court’s
subsequent incorporation of anti-commandeering theory and additional
limits to shield unique, core state functions into the sovereign immunity
doctrine. Part IV evaluates the Court of Appeals’ application of these
concepts in Reinhard and offers insight into the practical consequences
of the decision. This article ultimately concludes that Reinhard merely
constitutes a natural extension of the sound theoretical principles
announced in the Supreme Court’s most recent sovereign immunity
cases.
Moreover, the practical consequences for state agency
enforcement of federal regulatory schemes will be minimal because of
the remaining avenues available for enforcing federal rights.

8
Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court of Appeals
noted that other courts had proceeded to the merits in cases despite the presence of state
agencies as opposing parties. Id. at 118 n.1. It distinguished those cases, however,
because they involved suits brought by private protection and advocacy systems set up by
states and not actual public state agencies. Id. More precisely, therefore, Reinhard is the
first instance in which a court confronted public state administrative agencies on
opposing sides of litigation.
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THE REINHARD DECISION
A. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s
Decision
In Virginia v. Reinhard, a Virginia administrative agency
brought suit against the officers of three other Virginia administrative
agencies. The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy (“VOPA”)
filed a complaint against the officers of the Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services
(“DMHMRSAS”), the Central Virginia Training Center (“CVTC”), and
the Central State Hospital (“CSH”) in their official capacities.9 VOPA is
an agency charged with protecting and advocating the rights and interests
of disabled persons within the Commonwealth.10 Although a state
agency, it constitutes a protection and advocacy system created under the
authority of federal enabling statutes to safeguard federal rights.11
Congress incentivizes state legislatures to create such administrative
agencies by providing funding for protection and advocacy systems that
meet the requirements of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (“DDA”) and the Protection and Advocacy for
Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI”).12
These federal statutes grant state advocacy systems such as
VOPA authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of disabled
persons in state custody.13 The DDA provides that in order for state
advocacy systems to receive funding they must “have authority to
investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals if the incidents
9
Virginia v. Reinhard, No. 3:07cv734, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *1–2 (E.D.
Va. July 18, 2008), rev’d, 568 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2009).
10
Id. at *2. The relevant Virginia statute establishing VOPA provides, “The
Department for Rights of Virginians with Disabilities is hereby established as an
independent state agency to be known as the Virginia Office for Protection and
Advocacy. The Office is designated as the agency to protect and advocate for the rights
of persons with mental, cognitive, sensory, physical or other disabilities and to receive
federal funds on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia to implement the federal
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, the federal
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the federal Rehabilitation
Act, the Virginians with Disabilities Act and such other related programs as may be
established by state and federal law.” Va. Code. Ann. § 51.5-39.2 (2009).
11
Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *2 (citing Development Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15001, et. seq. (2006), and its
implementing regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 1385, et. Seq. (2008); Protection and Advocacy
for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et. seq. (2006)).
12
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 114 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001–15115; 42 U.S.C. §§
10801–10851).
13
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15043, 10805; Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-39.4 (2009)).
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are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that
such incidents occurred.”14 The PAIMI similarly provides that advocacy
systems have the authority to “investigate incidents of abuse and neglect
of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the
system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents
occurred.”15 In addition, federal law allows such agencies to access the
records of individuals subject to investigation under certain
circumstances, such as where the agency has probable cause to believe
the individual has suffered abuse or neglect.16 The DDA provides that
advocacy systems shall “have access to all the records of any individual
with a developmental disability in a situation in which a complaint has
been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status
or treatment of that individual . . . or there is probable cause to believe
that such individual has been subject to neglect or abuse.”17 Similarly,
the PAIMI grants systems authority to “have access to all records of any
individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts
are unknown) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the
system or with respect to whom . . . there is probable cause to believe
that such individual has been the subject of abuse or neglect.”18
In Reinhard, VOPA sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
enforce these provisions for access to records.19 Specifically, VOPA
sought access to records relating to certain deaths and injuries of
individuals in the custody of DMHRSAS and residing at CVTC and
CSH.20 DMHMRSAS responded that the records were protected under
Virginia’s peer review privilege and refused to provide them to VOPA.21
14

42 U.S.C. § 15043(B).
42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A).
16
Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *2–3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15043,
10805, 10806).
17
42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(I)(ii)(III).
18
42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4)(B)(iii). The applicable federal regulations essentially
restate this grant of authority to investigate where probable cause of abuse or neglect
exists. 42 C.F.R. 51.41(b)(2)(iii). A subsequent provision states that “‘records”‘ includes
reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment or reports prepared
by an agency charged with investigating reports or incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury
occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at
such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning
records.” 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(3)(A).
19
See Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *2, 3–4.
20
Id. at *3.
21
Id. Presumably DMHMRSAS was arguing privilege under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01581.17 which provides, “The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any (i)
medical staff committee, utilization review committee, or other committee, board, group,
commission or other entity as specified in § 8.01-581.16; (ii) nonprofit entity that
15
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Whether DMHRSAS could assert this privilege seems subject to doubt
because the reports in question arguably were not prepared for quality
assurance.22 The court, however, did not address the merits of the
privilege assertion.23 Subsequently, VOPA brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the
respective officers of the three agencies in their official capacities,
asserting that they were violating federal law by refusing to turn over the
records.24 The officers filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing
inter alia that sovereign immunity prohibited VOPA from suing the
Commonwealth of Virginia in federal district court without its consent.25
The Eastern District of Virginia thus initially confronted the issue of
whether one state administrative agency could hail another agency from
the same state into federal court consistent with sovereign immunity.

provides a centralized credentialing service; or (iii) quality assurance, quality of care, or
peer review committee established pursuant to guidelines approved or adopted by (a) a
national or state physician peer review entity, (b) a national or state physician
accreditation entity, (c) a national professional association of health care providers or
Virginia chapter of a national professional association of health care providers, (d) a
licensee of a managed care health insurance plan (MCHIP) as defined in § 38.2-5800, (e)
the Office of Emergency Medical Services or any regional emergency medical services
council, or (f) a statewide or local association representing health care providers licensed
in the Commonwealth, together with all communications, both oral and written,
originating in or provided to such committees or entities, are privileged communications
which may not be disclosed or obtained by legal discovery proceedings unless a circuit
court, after a hearing and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being
shown, orders the disclosure of such proceedings, minutes, records, reports, or
communications . . . Oral communications regarding a specific medical incident
involving patient care, made to a quality assurance, quality of care, or peer review
committee established pursuant to clause (iii), shall be privileged only to the extent made
more than 24 hours after the occurrence of the medical incident.” Va. Code Ann. § 8.01581.17(B) (2007).
22
See Witzke v. Martha Jefferson Surgery Ctr., L.L.C., 70 Va. Cir. 217 (Albemarle
County 2006).
23
Indeed, the merits DMHMRSAS’s assertion of peer review privilege was not
crucial to the real issue of whether a state agency could sue another state agency under Ex
Parte Young. At no point did the courts suggest that DMHMRSAS’s refusal to turn over
the reports based on privielege as opposed to some other reason was material to the
outcome of the case.
24
Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *3–4.
25
See id. at *4. As discussed further below, although VOPA had in fact brought suit
against officers of a state administrative agency, the United States Supreme Court has
long recognized that a suit against an officer acting under authority of state law, who has
no personal interest in the case, is for all intents and purposes a suit against the state
itself. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 151 (1908) (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, in suing the officers of DMHMRSAS, CVTC, and CSH, VOPA was suing the
Commonwealth of Virginia in federal district court.
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Judge Payne prefaced his analysis by stating the general rule that
states enjoy sovereign immunity from private suits, a proposition for
which he cited to Alden v. Maine, one of the more recent landmark
sovereign immunity cases.26 Drawing on United States Supreme Court
precedent, he then proceeded to outline the recognized exceptions to
sovereign immunity.27 Having dispensed with other exceptions, the court
proceeded to consider whether Ex Parte Young applied and allowed
VOPA to bring suit against Virginia.28 Judge Payne prefaced his Ex
Parte Young analysis by acknowledging that VOPA had brought action
against state officials in their official capacities, a necessary “predicate”
for the exception.29 VOPA argued that under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard,
its complaint fairly pled the Ex Parte Younger exception because it
alleged a continuing violation of federal law and sought injunctive
relief.30 Judge Payne concluded that under the Verizon Maryland v.
Public Service Commission standard, the Ex Parte Young doctrine
applied and the case could proceed.31 In alleging that the defendants
refused to provide the records as required by the statutes, VOPA had
26

Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *7 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999)).
27
Id. at *7–8 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized two
exceptions to sovereign immunity in addition to Ex Parte Young. First, Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity if it acts pursuant to its enforcement power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and “it has ‘unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity’” in the relevant statute. Id. at *7 (quoting Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 59 (1996)). Second, states may voluntarily waive
sovereign immunity either by consenting to suit or by accepting federal funding that is
expressly conditioned waiver. Id. at *8 (citing College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)).
28
Abrogation was not applicable to the case because the federal enabling statutes
contained no express language providing for abrogation. See id. at *8; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 15001, et. seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et. seq. As to waiver, the court set out the
requirement that Congress must explicitly state that receipt of federal funding under the
statute in question depends on consent to suit to secure waiver. Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54922, at *8 (quoting Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Based on Fourth Circuit precedent, Judge Payne determined that in order to secure
waiver, a statutory provision must actually use the term “sovereign immunity” to signal
to states their consent to suit. Thus, the provision on which VOPA relied did not convey
the “requisite expression of ‘a clear intent to condition participation . . . on a State’s
consent to waive its constitutional immunity.’” Id. at *12–13 (citing Madison, 474 F.3d
at 131).
29
Id. at *14.
30
Id.
31
Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *16 (citing Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Under Verizon, in order to overcome a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in an Ex Parte Young action, the plaintiff must plead an
ongoing violation of federal law by a state actor and seek prospective injunctive relief. Id.
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alleged an ongoing violation of federal law.32 Moreover, because VOPA
sought an injunction, it sought only prospective relief—that the
defendants release the records.33
As a final consideration, Judge Payne addressed whether
VOPA’s claim implicated Virginia’s “special sovereignty interest” which
would remove the case from the Ex Parte Young exception under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho.34
The defendants posited that federal courts could not intervene in an
intramural dispute between administrative agencies or branches within a
state government because such disputes implicated internal government
processes, a vital sphere of state sovereignty.35 VOPA responded that
this argument transcended the recognized limits of special sovereign
interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.36 Judge Payne agreed
that the case did not implicate Virginia’s special sovereignty interests.37
He observed that cases where federal courts should bow out due to
special sovereignty interests are those involving issues “that are uniquely
a state’s concern, most commonly the state’s internal budgetary
arrangements.”38 By contrast, the administration of a federal program
did not interfere with any state sovereign prerogative.39
Judge Payne relied on Antrican v. Odom, in which the Fourth
Circuit held that sovereign immunity did not bar a suit to enjoin
32

Id.
Id. As explained further below, only suits for prospective injunctive relief are
permitted under Ex Parte Young because monetary damages would assuredly be paid out
of the state treasury; therefore, the state would be the true party in interest and the fiction
of Ex Parte Young would break down.
34
See id. As discussed further below, in Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, the
United States Supreme Court based its decision that the Ex Parte Young exception did not
apply on the premise that land ownership was a strong sovereign interest retained by the
state and that interference with that interest would be “as intrusive as almost any
conceivable retroactive levy upon the funds of the Treasury.” Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. at 287–88. The Court also made clear that “[w]here, as here, the parties
invoke federal principles to challenge state administrative action, the courts of the State
have a strong interest in integrating those sources of law within their own system for the
proper judicial control of state officials.” Id. at 276.
35
Id. at *16–17.
36
Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *17.
37
Id.
38
Id. (citing Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986, 998, 989
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that whether taxes for desegregation should fall on the state or
individual school districts was an internal dispute between two government entities which
a federal court should not adjudicate); Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 84 F.3d
707, 716 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to interfere in state finances); Harris v. Angelina
County, 31 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1994)).
39
See id. at *18–19 (citing Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 189 (4th Cir. 2002)).
33
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compliance with the Medicare Act because “‘[a] state’s interest in
administering a welfare program at least partially funded by the federal
government is not such a core sovereign interest as to preclude
application of Ex Parte Young.’”40 The court observed, “Defendants
would have this Court refrain from deciding any cases brought by a state
agency against another state agency. However, Defendants have cited no
decision which supports such a broad rule. It is the nature of the issue to
be decided, not who brings the suit that potentially implicates
sovereignty interests.”41 Thus, Judge Payne held that the case could
proceed. In so doing, he found that the application of the Ex Parte Young
exception did not depend on the identity of the plaintiffs. Rather, the
nature of the action governed the exception Virginia, however, swiftly
appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which would review the district court’s decision de
novo.42
B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s Decision
A three judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
prefaced its decision by confirming, “State sovereign immunity is a
bedrock principle of ‘Our Federalism.’”43 In so doing, the Court of
Appeals signaled its intention to take a broad approach to state sovereign
immunity, drawing on the structural principles defining the Supreme
Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence. Continuing, it cited to Supreme
Court precedent for the proposition that sovereign immunity’s central
purpose “‘is to “accord the States the respect owed them as” joint
sovereigns.’”44 Upon entering the union, the states retained certain
40

Id. at *19 (quoting Antrican, 290 F.3d at 189).
Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *19.
42
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 115.
43
Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). In Younger, the United
States Supreme Court expounded on the notion of “Our Federalism:” “The concept does
not mean blind deference to ‘States Rights’ any more than it means centralization of
control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts . . . What
the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Based on this concept, the
Supreme Court held that a federal injunction against a state prosecution under a facially
unconstitutional statute was not an appropriate use of the Ex Parte Younger doctrine. Id.
at 49, 52–53. Thus, from the start, the Court of Appeals signaled its intention to leave
internal state processes free from intervention by federal courts.
44
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 115 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002)).
41
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crucial attributes of sovereignty, one of which is immunity from suit
without their consent.45 The Court of Appeals, however, recognized the
three major exceptions to sovereign immunity: congressional abrogation,
waiver, and the Ex Parte Young doctrine.46 Because the parties agreed
that Virginia’s sovereign immunity barred VOPA’s suit against the
agency officials absent one of the exceptions, the Court of Appeals, like
the district court below, proceeded to consider the exceptions’
applicability in turn.47 The core of the decision, however, focused on Ex
Parte Young.
VOPA continued to argue that under the Verizon standard, Ex
Parte Young applied to its suit because it had alleged an ongoing
violation of federal law by the defendants’ failure to turn over the records
and it sought prospective injunctive relief.48 To this the Court of Appeals
responded that “it is hardly so simple,” signaling a departure from the
cursory analysis of Judge Payne below.49 The Court of Appeals
elaborated:
[T]his case differs from Ex Parte Young in a critical
respect: the plaintiff there was not a state agency.
Instead, the plaintiffs in Ex Parte Young were private
parties. And while no subsequent decision has
45

Id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 714, 715–19; Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 751–
52; Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 54). The Court of Appeals, thus, alluded to
Supreme Court precedent recognizing that sovereign immunity rests on constitutional
structure and extends beyond the limited language of the Eleventh Amendment.
46
Id. (internal citations omitted).
47
Id. (internal citations omitted). Beginning with abrogation, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court that this exception did not apply because Congress did not
unequivocally express its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the statutory
language. Id. at 115–16 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)).
The Court of Appeals, however, was quick to clarify that it was not holding that Congress
could not abrogate sovereign immunity under the present facts. Id. at 116. Both the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a valid grant of constitutional authority to abrogate sovereign immunity to
protect the rights of disabled persons. Id. (citing United States v. Georgia, 547 U.S. 151,
159 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004); Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005)). With this extended
treatment of abrogation, the Court of Appeals cautiously reassured the federal
government that it was not powerless to enforce federal rights and protection advocacy
systems by enabling private individuals to bring suit in federal court. However, the Court
of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision. Likewise, the Court of Appeals upheld the
district court’s decision on waiver without any significant departure from its reasoning.
See id. at 116–17. Again, however, the Court of Appeals was cautious to reassure
Congress that it could extract waiver from the states under the present circumstances. See
id. at 118.
48
Id.
49
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 118.
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expressly limited the application of Ex Parte Young to
suit by a private plaintiff, many decisions have
recognized this basic element of the doctrine . . .
VOPA has cited no case, nor have we found any
holding that—or even analyzing whether—the Ex
Parte Young doctrine applies equally when the
plaintiff is a state agency.50

Thus, the Court of Appeals incorporated a new limitation to
application of Ex Parte Young in addition to those recognized by the
Supreme Court in Verizon: the plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive
relief for an ongoing violation of federal law must be a private individual
and not a state government agency. To support this new limitation on Ex
Parte Young, the Court of Appeals drew primarily on historical and
structural analysis which has characterized the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence in the area of federalism.
Drawing from the Supreme Court’s historical analysis in Alden
v. Maine, the Court of Appeals initially posited that the absence of prior
case law recognizing Ex Parte Young in the context of a state agency
plaintiff is significant because states retain immunity from actions that
were “‘anomalous and unheard of when the constitution was adopted.’”51
The Court of Appeals adopted the Supreme Court’s recent assumption
50
Id. (citing Semiole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (“[A]n individual can bring
suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer’s conduct is in compliance
with federal law . . . .”); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 (referring to Ex Parte Young suits
by “private individuals”); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 143).
51
Id. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999)). In Alden v. Maine, the
Supreme Court rendered a sovereign immunity decision that appeared to pay significant
homage to the anti-commandeering line of cases discussed further in section III below.
Having determined in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida that Article I did not grant
Congress authority to abrogate sovereign immunity in federal courts, the Court
confronted the novel issue of whether it gave Congress the power to subject
nonconsenting states to suit in their own courts. See id. at 741. The Court harkened to
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 14 (1992) and United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 818
(1997) for the principle that states maintain a concurrent power to affect citizens. Id. at
713, 730. The Supreme Court asserted that the “power to press a State’s own courts into
federal service to coerce the other branches of the State . . . is the power first to turn the
State against itself and ultimately commandeer the entire political machinery of the State
against its will and at the behest of individuals.” Id. at 749 (citing Coeur d’Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. at 276). Moreover, the Court found that federal power to subject states to suit
raised the political accountability problems recognized in the anti-commandeering cases.
See id. at 750. Drawing again on Printz, the Court asserted that when the federal
government asserts control over the state’s internal political processes, it interferes with
the states’ ability to remain accountable to their own citizens. Id. at 751 (citing Printz,
521 U.S. at 920). In light of these structural considerations, the Supreme Court held that
states retain sovereign immunity from private suit in their own courts which Congress
cannot abrogate under Article I. Id. at 754.
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that ratification essentially froze the boundaries of sovereign immunity at
their contemporaneous reaches. Although below Judge Payne had cited
cases addressing the merits of Ex Parte Young actions where the plaintiff
was an agency, the Court of Appeals distinguished these cases because
the plaintiffs were in fact not public agencies, but private advocacy
systems.52 Thus, the Court of Appeals assigned paramount importance to
the official, public status of the plaintiff agency. VOPA responded that
the identity of the plaintiff was simply irrelevant.53 The court indicated,
however, that this dismissive approach ran contrary to the guidelines
announced in Coeur d’Alene, where the Supreme Court cautioned against
“‘reflexive reliance’” and “‘empty formalism’” when considering
application of Ex Parte Young.54 Rather, application of Ex Parte Young
must account for the structure of the federalist system and the sovereign
interests at stake.55 Therefore, the court proceeded to consider “whether
the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted” when the plaintiff is a
state agency in light of the structure of dual federalism and the sovereign
interests of the state.56
The Court of Appeals departed from the premise that sovereign
immunity safeguards the dignity of the states and, therefore, prohibits
federal courts from intruding into the internal processes and cacophony
of state government.57 “[F]ederal court adjudication of an ‘intramural
contest’ between a state agency and state officials encroaches more
severely on the dignity and sovereignty of the states than an Ex Parte
Young action brought by a private plaintiff,” reasoned the Court of
Appeals58 The ability of a state agency to force a state to answer to a
federal court would constitute a violation of a state’s sovereign dignity.
Allowing a federal court to act as the referee between two elements of
fractured state authority would be “antithetical to our system of dual

52

Id. at 118 n.1 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 119.
54
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 119. (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 270, 281).
55
Id. (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 270).
56
See id. (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 74).
57
Id. at 119–20.
58
Id. (citing Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185, 191 (4th
Cir. 2005) (Wilson, J., concurring). Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v.
Reinhard was a prior case involving the same parties as the case under discussion. In that
case, the Court of Appeals held that VOPA could not bring a Section 1983 claim against
the defendants because VOPA was a state agency. Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 120 n. 2.
Although the case did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity, Judge Wilson observed
that such an action brought by a state agency against a state in federal court constituted a
serious indignity to the state. Id.
53

2010]

CLOSING THE GAP

233

sovereignty.”59 Sovereign immunity shields the states from “federal
meddling” in their internal affairs.60 As support for this proposition, the
court drew primarily on the Alden decision’s expansive language
regarding the protection of state government machinery.61
The Alden Court based its holding that Article I did not give
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in states’ own
courts on the aphorism that such abrogation power would constitute the
power “to turn the State against itself and ultimately commandeer the
political machinery of the State against its will.”62 By requiring state
courts to hear cases against state officers, Congress was essentially
playing the state judiciaries off of state legislatures and executives.
Giving the federal government such power “‘would strike at the heart of
political accountability so essential to our liberty and republican form of
government.’”63 The Court of Appeals perceived a comparable danger in
allowing a state agency to bring suit against another state agency in
federal court under Ex Parte Young. Federal courts would essentially
have the power to play state agencies off of each other, which would
result in indignity to the states.64 Moreover, allowing federal courts to
serve this mediating function between state agencies would undermine
political accountability because state citizens dissatisfied with the
outcome of the federal court’s decision would have nowhere to turn for
redress.65 Presumably, the court meant that the normal pressures
inherent in the electoral process normally applicable to state actors and
bodies would be useless against the federal judiciary. Thus, implicitly
drawing on Alden and the anti-commandeering line of cases discussed
further below, the Court of Appeals perceived the danger that federal
interference in conflicts between state agencies could displace the normal
processes of state government.
Here, the Court of Appeals arguably overlooked the argument
that citizens and states would have recourse to Congress. If dissatisfied
with a federal court’s interpretation of federal law, citizens could lobby
their national representatives to change federal law. The Court of
Appeals, however, may have been accounting for such barriers as
legislative inertia and the fact that the few interested parties in any given
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 120.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 749).
Id. (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 751).
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 121.
Id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 751).
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case might not have sufficient political leverage to affect such a redress.
Convincing Congress to change the law could be a difficult hill to climb
especially when the greater costs of the law are not immediately apparent
to the public. The Court of Appeals, however, did not limit its rationale
to the political accountability principles underlying the anticommandeering line. It also found that VOPA’s action raised special
sovereignty interests crucial to the dignity of the states.
In a separate section of the opinion, the Court of Appeals also
found that a suit under Ex parte Young in these circumstances would
implicate special sovereignty interests similar to those identified by the
Supreme Court in Coeur d’Alene.66 Citing to a series of cases holding
that municipalities political subdivisions of states could not obtain relief
under federal law against the application of state statutes, the Court of
Appeals suggested that states have special sovereignty interests in
“intramural state conflicts” with which federal courts should not
interfere.67 Based largely on these anti-commandeering and special
sovereignty principles incorporated into sovereign immunity
jurisprudence in Alden and Coeur d’Alene, the Court of Appeals
determined that Ex Parte Young should not be extended to cases with
state agencies on opposing sides.68 Arguably, Reinhard implicated a
Congressional interest not present in Coeur d’Alene. In Coeur d’Alene,
the plaintiff challenged state violation of a federal statute fixing the
boundaries of an Indian Reservation.69 In Reinhard, on the other hand,
VOPA challenged state violation of federal laws intended to promote
equal treatment for disabled and mentally ill persons, implicating
Congress’ supreme power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nowhere
in Coeur d’Alene, however, did the court suggest that sovereign
immunity depended on weighing the relative strength of state interests
against federal interests. Rather, the court simply announced that when
an action under Ex Parte Young intrudes on states’ special sovereignty
interests, the exception should not apply.
The Court of Appeals reiterated as a final observation, however,
that all of these problems could be avoided by either proper
congressional abrogation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
66

Id. at 121–23 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 122 – 23 (citing Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 53 S. Ct. 431, 77
L. Ed. 1015 (1933); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S. Ct. 534, 67 L.
Ed. 937 (1923); Stewart v. City of Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S. Ct. 15, 60 L. Ed. 120
(1915); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151 (1907)).
68
Id. at 121.
69
Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 264.
67
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Amendment or valid waiver.70 In such circumstances, citizens could
hold Congress or state governments accountable for the results of
litigation between state agencies.71 Moreover, such suits would impart
no indignity to the states because the states would have consented either
through their Congressional representatives or by accepting conditional
federal resources.72 Thus, the court seemed to suggest that Congress
should vindicate federal interests through abrogation or waiver and not
Ex Parte Young. As shown, the Court of Appeals rested its decision on
the abstract structural theory that has characterized the Supreme Court’s
recent federalism. Indeed, the underlying rationale of Reinhard proves
difficult to comprehend without a thorough examination of the Supreme
Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Recently, the Court has
incorporated the anti-commandeering principles of political
accountability into sovereign immunity. In addition, it has recognized
unique sovereign interests that should remain free of federal
adjudication. These more recent theories form the basis of Reinhard.
The origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine, however, are the proper
starting point for this examination.
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE
APPLIED IN REINHARD
A. The Early Development of Sovereign Immunity and the Ex Parte
Young Doctrine
The origins of sovereign immunity extend back to ancient
English common law, certain remnants of which prevailed at the time of
ratification.73 The consensus among the Founders appeared to be that the
states retained their sovereign immunity after ratification as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty.74 The passage of the Eleventh Amendment and
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana
confirmed that states have retained their sovereign immunity in our
system. Thus, although sovereign immunity derives from ancient

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
See DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: NEW
FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 71–80 (Carolina Academic Press, 2005); Alfred Hill, In Defense
of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 493–98 (2001). Under the
ancient common law of England, the sovereign could not be sued in courts which it had
created by its own power.
74
Hill, supra note 73, at 495–98.
71
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traditions, it has to some extent been incorporated into the Constitution.75
Although the Supreme Court has sometimes conceptualized sovereign
immunity as emanating from the Eleventh Amendment, it has made clear
that sovereign immunity extends beyond that limited language. Thus,
although paid homage and incorporated by the Constitution, sovereign
immunity derives from ancient, fundamental principles of government.
As such its precise contours prove amorphous and difficult to define. The
Eleventh Amendment provides: “The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”76 To the Supreme
Court fell the task of determining the precise limits imposed on federal
jurisdiction by this language and the constitutional structure.
In Hans, a Louisiana citizen had brought suit in federal court
against the state of Louisiana, alleging that an amendment to the state
constitution, prohibiting the state from paying interest on certain bonds,
violated the Contracts Clause of the federal Constitution.77 The Supreme
Court, therefore, confronted the novel question of whether a state could
be sued by one of its own citizens in federal court because the case arises
under the Constitution or federal law.78 At this point, the Court’s
decisions had established that the Eleventh Amendment prevented a state
from being sued in federal court by a citizen of another state or a foreign
country based on federal question jurisdiction.79 The plaintiff claimed
that because he was a citizen of Louisiana, he did not fall into either of
these prohibited categories and could bring suit against his own state.80
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, finding
that the Eleventh Amendment stood for a prohibition far broader than its
simple language.81 With the Eleventh Amendment, “[a]ny such power as
that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals
against the States, had been expressly disclaimed.”82 The Court further
75
See Jonathan Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the
Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L. J. 1167, 1173–75 (2003).
76
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI.
77
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 973 (5th ed. 2003).
78
Hans, 134 U.S. at 9 (1890).
79
Id. at 10 (citing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883); Hagood v. Southern, 117
U.S. 52 (1886); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 12, 13–16. The Court asserted that the passage of the Eleventh Amendment
signaled acceptance of Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia, positing that a
state simply cannot be sued without its consent. Id. at 16.
82
Id. at 12, 15.
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announced, “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amendable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . and the
exemption . . . is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union.”83 Thus, sovereign immunity derived not so much from the
actual text of the Eleventh Amendment but from the inherent nature of
sovereign statehood. The Supreme Court thus incorporated ancient,
common law notions of sovereignty into the constitutional structure.
Recognizing the clear tension between sovereign immunity and the
supremacy of federal law, the Court asserted:
The legislative department of a State represents its
polity and its will; and is called upon by the highest
demands of natural and political law to preserve
justice and judgment, and to hold inviolate public
obligations . . . But to deprive the legislature of the
power of judging what the honor and safety of the
State may require, even at the expense of a temporary
failure to discharge public debts, would be attended
with greater evils than such failure can cause.84

In the Court’s view, the state legislature, directly accountable to
the citizens of a state, must maintain control of the state fisc, free from
federal intervention. Hans, therefore, announced the rule that a state is
not amendable to suit in federal court by its own citizens even in the face
of a constitutional violation by the state.85
Relatively soon after Hans, the Court seemingly sought to
resolve the tension between expansive sovereign immunity and the
supremacy of federal law by carving out an exception. In Ex Parte
Young, Minnesota shareholders of various railroad corporations brought
suit in federal court, seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota
from enforcing state railroad rate regulations.86 The shareholders alleged
that the regulations were confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.87 The federal trial court entered a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the attorney general from
enforcing the regulations, and when he violated the injunction, the
federal circuit court held him in contempt.88
Throughout the
proceedings, the attorney general maintained that the Eleventh
83
84
85
86
87
88

Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
Id. at 21.
See id.
John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 992 (2008).
Id.
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908); Harrison, supra note 86, at 993.
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Amendment barred the plaintiff’s suit against him because it effectively
constituted an action by citizens against their own state.89 The Supreme
Court reviewed the trial court’s determination. The Court recognized that
a suit against state officers who have no personal stake in the subject
matter of the suit and defend only as representatives of the state is
virtually a suit against the state itself.90 Only the state has any real
interest in the action. Therefore, although the suit named an individual
state officer as defendant, it was in fact a suit against Minnesota by
Minnesota citizens which would appear to fall under the prohibition
announced in Hans.
Through a legal fiction, however, the Court articulated the rule
of law that a suit against a state officer who is violating federal law is not
a suit against the state.91 The court reasoned:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be
unconstitutional, and if it be so the use of the name of
the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the
injury of complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of and one which does not affect the State in
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an
illegal act upon the part of the state official in
attempting by the use of the name of the state to
enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
it is unconstitutional.92

Therefore, a suit against a state officer in violation of federal law
does not fall within the sovereign immunity prohibition because it is not
a suit against the state, but a suit against a rogue officer acting without
state authority because the state has no authority to enact an
unconstitutional law. If the rate regulations were in fact unconstitutional,
then the attorney general “proceeding under such enactment comes into
conflict with the superior authority of that constitution and he is . . .
stripped of his representative character and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual act.”93
Thus, by somewhat
convoluted logic, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to
sovereign immunity by which a state citizen may sue a state officer when
the state officer is violating federal law. The Supreme Court and
commentators have consistently labeled this rogue officer theory a “legal
89
90
91
92
93

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 143–44 (1908).
Id. at 151 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)).
See id. at 159–60.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159–60.
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fiction” because the officer in question is, in fact, acting pursuant to state
authority.94 Seeming to recognize the precarious footing of this legal
fiction, the Court subsequently refined the Ex Parte Young doctrine to
incorporate additional protections for state sovereignty.
In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court held that Ex Parte Young only
created an exception to sovereign immunity for suits brought for
prospective injunctive relief and not retrospective money damages.95
There, the plaintiff brought an individual class action against state
agency officials, alleging that they were violating federal regulations in
dispensing benefits under the federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged,
Blind, or Disabled.96 Finding the state officers in violation of federal
regulations, the federal district court granted a permanent injunction
requiring compliance with the regulations and also ordered the officers to
pay benefits wrongfully withheld.97 On review, the Supreme Court held
that Ex Parte Young permitted the element of the judgment that
constituted a prospective injunction requiring compliance with federal
law.98 The order to dispense funds, however, constituted retrospective
relief barred by sovereign immunity.99 The Court explained, “‘[W]hen
the action is in essence one for recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are the
nominal defendants.’”100
State immunity barred such retroactive
monetary relief that would “to a virtual certainty be paid from state
funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials . . . .”101
By thus restricting application of Ex Parte Young to suits for prospective
injunctive remedies, the Supreme Court preserved the fiction that the suit
was not in fact one against the state.
Synthesizing the principles of Ex Parte Young and Edelman, the
Supreme Court recently articulated a simple formula to determine the
applicability of the Ex Parte Young doctrine in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission.102
Federal courts must conduct “a
straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing
94

See Harrison, supra note 86, at 995.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–66 (1974).
96
Id. at 653.
97
Id. at 669.
98
Id. at 664.
99
Id.
100
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
101
Id. at 668.
102
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
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violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.”103 Thus, under the Court’s current jurisprudence the Ex
Parte Young exception to the sovereign immunity bar applies when a
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against a state officer in violation of
federal law. This seemingly simple framework, however, has been
complicated by two recent lines of cases that exemplify the Supreme
Court’s revival of federalist principles—the anti-commandeering cases
and the more recent sovereign immunity cases focusing on abrogation
and special state sovereign interests. Examination of these cases
demonstrates that sovereign immunity implicates far more complex
issues political accountability and state dignity. These cases form the
theoretical basis of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in
Reinhard.
B. The Anti-Commandeering Cases and the Modern Expansion of
Sovereign Immunity
In a line of cases that has come to be known as the “anticommandeering” cases, the Supreme Court drastically curtailed the
power of the federal government to interfere in the internal
administration and process of state governments.104 Although these cases
did not specifically address sovereign immunity, they mark the Court’s
adoption of a broad structuralist approach in its federalism jurisprudence
based on the “‘essential postulates’” of the constitution.105 The Court
derived limits on the reach of federal authority from the historical
understanding of the proper relationship between the federal government
and the states.106 The aphorisms adopted by the Court in these cases
form a crucial basis of its current sovereign immunity jurisprudence and
the Reinhard decision.107 Therefore, an understanding of the anti103

Id. at 645.
See Jennifer L. Greenblatt, What’s Dignity Got to Do with It?: Using AntiCommandeering Principles to Preserve State Sovereign Immunity, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 1,
11–15 (2008) (internal citations omitted); William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State
Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069,
1073–78 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
105
See generally Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of
Structure, 41 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1601 (2000) (observing that these cases mark the
conservative majority’s turning away from textualism and originalism to jurisprudence
based on an understanding of the historical relationship between the states and the federal
government).
106
Id.
107
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737–54 (1999) (consistently relying on Printz
v. United States); Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 120 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying in
large part on Alden).
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commandeering cases is crucial to grasping the Fourth Circuit’s decision.
Two cases are particularly noteworthy and go practically hand-in-hand.
In New York v. United States, the Court addressed the
constitutional validity of the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendment Act
of 1985, designed to encourage state level disposal of radioactive
waste.108 In the statute, Congress essentially sought to force states to
dispose of waste by either joining regional compacts with other states or
providing a disposal facility within the state itself.109 To this end, the
statute provided inter alia that if a state did not dispose of waste through
one of these two options by a certain date, the state would essentially
“take title” to the waste and be liable for any damages flowing from it.110
New York argued that this provision impermissibly directed the states to
regulate waste disposal in contravention of the principal of dual
sovereignty.111 The precise issue, therefore, was whether Congress could
direct the states to regulate in a particular manner.112 Writing for the
majority, Justice O’Connor initially stated that “Congress may not
simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”113
While Congress undoubtedly can act directly on the citizens in “areas of
intimate concern to the states,” Congress cannot order the states to
govern in accordance with its will.114 The Court reasoned:
In providing for a stronger central government,
therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution
that confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States. As we have seen, the Court
has consistently respected this choice. We have
always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring
or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly

108
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–51 (1992) (internal citations
omitted).
109
See id. 151–52 (internal citations omitted).
110
Id. at 153–54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1992)).
111
Id. at 159–60 (internal citations omitted).
112
Id. at 161.
113
New York, 505 U.S. at 161.(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981)).
114
Id. at 162.
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to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts.115

Thus, Congress cannot compel the states to create administrative
agencies and thereby indirectly regulate state citizens. The Court
explained that these limits of dual sovereignty are crucial to the political
accountability of both state and federal officials.116 If state citizens deem
federal policy contrary to their interests or decide that resources are
better expended elsewhere, they are free to elect state representatives
who will decline to participate in a federal regulatory program.117 In that
case, if the federal government decides to overpower state objections by
regulating citizens directly, it may do so “in full view of the public, and it
will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns
out to be detrimental or unpopular.”118 On the other hand, if the federal
government can commandeer the state machinery and compel state
legislatures to regulate, state representatives will face public hostility,
and federal officials can insulate themselves from the electoral
consequences of their actions.119 Therefore, allowing Congress to
conscript the state legislatures into doing its “dirty work” would
essentially undermine the popular check on federal representatives. By
giving states the ultimatum of either complying with federal regulations
or taking title to radioactive waste and suffering the hazardous
consequences, the statute coerced the states to act and commandeered
state governments.120 Thus, the particular provision in question was
beyond the powers of the federal government.121 Congress cannot
commandeer state legislatures to implement federal policy through state
regulations.
Shortly thereafter, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered substantially the same issue as applied to state executive
officers.122 In Printz, the Court addressed the constitutionality of certain
interim provisions of the 1993 amendments to the Gun Control Act of
115

Id. at 166 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 762–66; Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. at 288–89; Lane County v. Oregon,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76, 19 L. Ed. 101).
116
Id. at 168.
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Id.
118
New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
119
Id. at 169 (citing Merritt, 88 COLUM. L. REV., at 61–62; La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of
Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 639–65 (1985)).
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Id. at 175–76.
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Id. at 176.
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Printz, 521 U.S. 818, 902 (1997); see also Greenblatt, supra note 104, at 14–15.
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1968.123 These interim provisions required the chief law enforcement
officers (“CLEOs”) of state municipalities to conduct background
investigations of individuals seeking to purchase handguns.124 The
provisions, thus, directed state law enforcement officers to administer
federal regulations.125 The petitioners argued that such congressional
action compelling state officers to execute federal laws violated the
constitution.126 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia analyzed the
question in light of “historical understanding and practice” and the
“structure of the Constitution.”127 He first found that such use of state
officials by the federal government was contrary to the framework of
dual federalism. The Court initially recognized that “the Framers
rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and
through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state and
federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the
people.”128 The Constitution contemplates a system “‘establishing two
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who
sustain it and are governed by it.’”129 The states, therefore, retain a
residual sovereign sphere of action, and “[i]t is no more compatible with
this independence and autonomy that their officers be dragooned . . . into
administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the
independence and autonomy of the United States that its officers be
impressed into service for the execution of state laws.”130
In addition, the Court quickly shot down the United States’
assertion that requiring state officers to perform ministerial tasks did not
raise the same accountability dangers as coercion of state legislatures in
New York.131
By requiring state governments to absorb the
administrative costs attending enforcement of federal laws, federal
123
Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–03. The 1993 amendments were collectively known as the
“Brady Act.” Id. at 902.
124
Id. at 903 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1997)). Specifically, the provisions
required CLEOs to “‘make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days
whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law, including
research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a
national system designated by the Attorney General.’” Id.
125
Id. at 904.
126
Id. at 905.
127
Id.
128
Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (citing The Federalist, No. 15, at 109).
129
Id. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
130
Id. at 928.
131
Id. at 929–30.
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representatives could claim credit for solving policy problems without
requiring their constituencies provide the necessary funding.132 By
requiring the states to do the “dirty work,” Congress could reap all of the
benefits with none of the electoral costs that usually come with tough
policy decisions.
Even if no substantial monetary costs attend
enforcement of the federal scheme, the states may still take the blame for
the burdens and defects that attend such a scheme.133 Therefore, the
same basic problem of political accountability present in the legislative
context in New York applies likewise in the executive context. Congress
can come up with complex and potentially costly regulatory schemes and
make the states “play the bad guys” by enforcing them. The Supreme
Court, therefore, reaffirmed that “‘[t]he Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program”
and held that the interim provisions violated this rule.134 The federal
government cannot compel the states to enact a federal regulatory
program and cannot “circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State’s officers directly.”135 Subsequently, in Alden, the Supreme Court
would incorporate the “essential postulates” laid out in New York and
Printz into its sovereign immunity jurisprudence, greatly expanding the
sovereign immunity bar.136 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alluded
to these anti-commandeering principles in Reinhard and identified
political accountability problems as one major peril of allowing federal
courts to mediate power struggles between rival state agencies. In
addition, the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence has
adopted a distinct theoretical nuance, likewise not lost on the Reinhard
court. Under this line of decisions, a category of unique, core state
government functions remains outside the Ex Parte Young orbit.
The seminal case on special sovereignty interests, decided
exactly one week prior to Printz, while not explicitly relying on the anticommandeering line, certainly proved consistent with the Supreme
Court’s adoption of the structural approach to issues of dual federalism.
In Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, the Court adopted new
limitations on the Ex Parte Young doctrine, partially relied on by the
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Id. at 930.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (citing Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a
Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1580, n. 65 (1994)).
134
Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
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Id. at 935.
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Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 714, 731, 748, 751, 752, 754 (1999) (citing
Printz and New York).
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Fourth Circuit in Reinhard.137 The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (“Tribe”)
asserted ownership of the submerged lands and banks of all navigable
waters within the original boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation
as established by federal statute.138 The Tribe brought suit in federal
court against the State of Idaho and various state agencies and
officials.139 It sought a declaratory injunction that it was entitled to
exclusive use and enjoyment of the lands in question and a permanent
injunction prohibiting the state from regulating its exclusive use and
occupancy.140 The defendants argued that sovereign immunity barred the
Tribe’s suit against the state and its officers.141 The Supreme Court,
therefore, addressed the issue of whether the Tribe’s claim could proceed
under Ex Parte Young.142
From the beginning, the Court sought to narrow the gap in
sovereign immunity created by the exception. Justice Kennedy observed
that allowing a claim to proceed in federal court whenever a plaintiff
sought prospective injunctive relief for a violation of federal law would
reduce Ex Parte Young to an “empty formalism” and undermine the
Eleventh Amendment as a real limit on federal question jurisdiction.143
The Court asserted that “[a]pplication of the Young exception must
reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and
respect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious
fiction.”144 Therefore, Ex Parte Young should apply primarily where no
state forum is available to vindicate the plaintiffs’ federal rights.145 I n
this case, the Idaho state courts were open to adjudicate the dispute and
an effective state remedy was available, making a federal forum far less
necessary.146 Moreover, the Court emphasized that “[n]either in theory
or in practice has it been shown problematic to have federal claims
resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity would be
137

See Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270–71, 275–81, 281–
82 (1997); Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 119 (relying on Coeur d’Alene).
138
Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 264. The Tribe advanced several theories of its
ownership, including aboriginal right, which are not terribly important for the purposes of
this paper.
139
Id. at 265.
140
Id.
141
See id. The Supreme Court previously had recognized that Indian tribes maintained
the same status as foreign sovereigns, against whom the states enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Therefore, the Tribe’s suit against Idaho did raise the sovereign
immunity issue. Id. at 268–69.
142
See id. at 263, 266.
143
Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 270.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 270–71.
146
Id. at 274.

246

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:221

applicable in federal court but for an exception based on Young.”147 In
fact, to allow a case to proceed in federal court “based on the inherent
inadequacy of state forums would run counter to the basic principles of
federalism” because interpretation and application of federal law within
their own judiciaries is a “proprietary concern” of the states.148 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly relied on the availability of
Virginia state forums for its decision in Reinhard.149 The Court of
Appeals noted, “The state officials concede, and VOPA does not dispute,
that [it] may bring this suit in state court and obtain the same relief that it
seeks here.”150 Thus, the Court of Appeals appears to have followed
Justice Kennedy’s inclination to channel disputes involving state
administrative agencies into state courts in order to allow states to tailor
federal law to their unique needs and traditions.
In the Reinhard case, for instance, the Virginia courts arguably
would have been in a better position to reconcile the investigatory
provisions of the DDA and PAIMIA with Virginia’s peer review
privilege statute because of its special competence in the area of Virginia
law. Indeed, at no point did VOPA argue that the state courts were
closed to its claim.151 Indeed, the parties agreed that “Virginia’s
sovereign immunity would not bar an original action by VOPA for a writ
of mandamus brought in the Virginia Supreme Court.”152 VOPA always
had the option of proceeding in Virginia courts to obtain access to the
records. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause would require Virginia courts to
enforce the federal rights in question.153 In Testa v. Katt, the Supreme
Court held that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to adjudicate
federal causes of action absent a valid excuse such as a lack of judicial
resources.154 The Court has subsequently clarified that state courts
cannot discriminate against federal questions based on disagreement with
the policies embodied in federal law.155 Rather, a state court may only
refuse to adjudicate and enforce federal rights on the basis of a neutral
rule of judicial administration.156 Therefore, as long as state courts
147

Id. at 274–75.
Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 275.
149
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 123.
150
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389, 391, 394
(1947); Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29).
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Testa, 330 U.S. at 389, 814–15.
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See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371–75 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
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remained in operation, the Constitution would require them to adjudicate
a suit arising under federal law and to enforce federal rights. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that VOPA’s fears that
disabled persons could not adequately assert their rights without access
to federal courts was illusory.157 Absent special circumstances, state
courts remain obligated to vindicate federal rights. Thus, VOPA could
have resorted to Virginia courts to resolve the conflict between the
federal law and Virginia’s peer review privilege statute.158
Some would doubtless argue that the Congress’ passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1875159 and the subsequent establishment of general
federal question jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. section 1331 and removal
jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. section 1441 intended to promote the
157

Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 123.
At least one of the attorneys for VOPA has called this assertion into question. See
E-mail from Seth Galantar, Of Counsel, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to Harrison Gates,
author (Mar. 24, 2010, 14:14 EST) (on file with author). Mr. Galantar has suggested that
the principle that the Supremacy Clause requires a state court to hear a federal cause of
action against state defendants cannot be reconciled with Alden’s language suggesting
that the Constitution does not require state courts to do what it cannot require federal
courts to do. Id. Moreover, he suggests that Alden could not have reaffirmed a simple
non-discrimination principle against hearing federal causes of action in state courts
because in that case, the State of Maine permitted suits against itself in state court for
monetary relief, including wage claims for violations of the State’s minimum-wage law.
Id. (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 664, 670 (1998)). Yet, the Supreme Court still
found that the state courts did not have to entertain an analogous claim under the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act. Mr. Galanter’s point is well taken. The Supreme Court appears
to have applied inconsistent principles and failed to articulate a clear rule. Neverthless, it
may be possible to reconcile the anti-discrimination principle with the Alden holding. If it
is not possible, then the Supreme Court should clear up this ambiguity at its next
opportunity. In Alden, the court tersely dismissed the argument that Maine had abused its
sovereign immunity by discriminating against the FLSA claims, stating: “[T]here is no
evidence that the State has manipulated sovereign immunity in a systematic fashion to
discriminate against federal causes of action. To the extent Maine has chosen to consent
to certain classes of suits while maintaining its immunity from others, it has done no
more than exercise a privilege of sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity
from suit.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 759. The meaning of this statement is unclear. On the one
hand, the first sentence could mean that plaintiffs must demonstrate a general pattern of
using sovereign immunity to keep federal claims out of state court to show discrimination
against federal claims. On the other hand, the second sentence could mean that a state’s
assertion of its sovereign immunity is itself a neutral justification for refusal to entertain a
federal claim. E-mail from Seth Galantar, Of Counsel, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to
Harrison Gates, author (Mar. 24, 2010, 17:43 EST) (on file with author). This latter
interpretation appears to run contrary to Howlett v. Rose, where the Court found that
under the Testa line of cases, state cannot assert its sovereign immunity against a federal
action if it waives such immunity for similar state actions and cannot discriminate against
federal causes of action based only on the content of federal law. 496 U.S. at 371–75. The
Supreme Court should work to bring bring these inconsistencies into alignment.
159
Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
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uniformity of federal law by circumventing divergent state interpretation
of federal law envisioned by Justice Kennedy.160 Indeed, the driving
purpose behind the Judiciary Act of 1875—the forerunner to modern
federal question and removal jurisdiction—was to promote uniform
application of federal laws in an increasingly nationalized commercial
setting.161 General federal question jurisdiction, however, is not
necessarily inconsistent with the more narrow restraints of the Supreme
Court’s subsequent sovereign immunity jurisprudence. First, numerous
scholars have argued that the concern driving the Judiciary Act of 1875
was not so much the need to vindicate individual federal rights against
the states, but to avoid the prejudice to private business prevailing in
state courts applying federal law.162 Thus, initially relegating citizens’
suits against states for violations of federal law to state courts does not
run counter to federal question jurisdiction’s more general objective of
opening the federal courts to suits arising under federal law between
private individuals.
Second, the Supreme Court addressed the
implications of the Judiciary Act of 1875 in Hans v. Louisiana.163 In
160

See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1331–32 (1984).
161
See James H. Chadbourn & Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions,
90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 641–42 (1942).
162
See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 64–65 (MacMillan, 1927);
LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 381 (Simon & Schuster,
1973); HAROLD MELVIN HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 536–40 (Knopf, 1973);
STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 157–58 (Univ. of
Chicago, 1968); Chadbourne & Levin, supra note 147, at 641–55; Michael G. Collins,
The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 727–29
(1986) (internal citations omitted); William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal
Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 341 (1969). At the time of passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1875, industrial and entrepreneurial interests were confronting
unfriendly state regulation and state court decisions not only in the former Confederacy,
but also in the burgeoning Midwest. Collins, supra, at 727 (citing Wiecek, supra, at 341).
In the early 1870s, the Granger movement and its animosity towards railroads were at
their height in state and local governments. Id. at 727–28 (citing Friedman, supra, at
391). Congress, therefore, “appreciated the business community’s ‘unwillingness . . . to
rely upon state courts for the vindication of [their] constitutional rights’ and . . . intended
them as one of the beneficiaries of the federal question removal provisions.” Id. at 728
(citing Frankfurter & Landis, supra, at 65 n.31). Although the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1875 was contemporaneous with the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and other statutes
designed to protect individual federal rights, most of these statutes included their own
jurisdictional provisions. Id. at 727 n.55. Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1875 likely represents
an expansion of federal jurisdiction in response to state prejudice against growing
financial and industrial interests as opposed to a superfluous jurisdictional grant to protect
individual rights.
163
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890) (“The ground taken is that under the
constitution, as well as under the act of congress passed to carry it into effect, a case is
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Hans, the Court reasoned that the Act gave federal courts original
jurisdiction “‘concurrent with the courts of the several states.’”164
Therefore, because “state courts have no power to entertain suits by
individuals against a state without its consent” and federal jurisdiction is
coextensive with that of the states, it follows that federal courts cannot
take jurisdiction of a suit against a state by an individual.165 Moreover,
the Court recognized a structural, constitutional prohibition against
proceedings that were “anomalous” and “unheard of” when the
constitution was adopted.166
Coeur d’Alene and Reinhard, therefore, in channeling suits
involving state agencies into state courts, have not ignored Congress’
policy of uniform application of federal law as reflected in the Judiciary
Act of 1875. Rather, the Supreme Court recognized long ago in Hans
that the authoritative structure of the Constitution confines that policy to
a certain context. The Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence has not
tried to undermine these statutes but merely has recognized that suits
against the states themselves raise special considerations which elevate
them above Congress’ preference for strict uniformity. General federal
question jurisdiction leaves room for the notion that when a state is sued
under federal law, it has a proprietary concern in interpreting that law
itself. Nowhere in the statutes does Congress expressly abrogate
sovereign immunity. Therefore, a better understanding of Justice
Kennedy’s argument in Coeur d’Alene is that state courts have a strong
interest in interpreting federal law when it touches on the state’s
sovereign functions or status. Indeed, Couer d’Alene recognized that the
state’s interest is particularly strong in the context of complex
intertwinement of federal law and state administrative law as was present
in Reinhard. In sum, a structural, constitutional predilection for “home
cooking” prevails when a suit against a state implicates its core sovereign
functions or interests. Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals pointed out in Reinhard, the Supreme Court maintains the
authority to review state court decisions on federal law even if sovereign
immunity would bar original federal jurisdiction.167 Therefore, federal
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, without regard to the character of the parties,
if it arises under the constitution or laws of the United States . . . The language relied on
is . . . the corresponding clause of the act conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit court . . .
as found in the act of March 3, 1875 . . . .).
164
Id. at 18 (quoting 18 Stat. 470 (1875)).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 123 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages
& Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 30–31 (1989)).

250

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:221

courts would always be able to counter state interpretations that strayed
too far from Congressional intent.
The Coeur d’Alene plurality opinion submitted that state courts
have a special interest in adjudicating claims involving state
administrative agencies and officials. The plurality recognized, “It is a
principal concern of the court system in any State to define and maintain
a proper balance between the State’s courts on the one hand, and its
officials and administrative agencies on the other.”168 Indeed, this is
crucial to the coherent development of administrative law because “state
courts and state agencies work to elaborate an administrative law
designed to reflect the State’s own rules and traditions concerning the
respective scope of judicial review and administrative discretion.”169 The
plurality went on to identify the present case as one which would give
states the opportunity to augment administrative law.170 The plurality
recognized, “Where, as here, the parties invoke federal principles to
challenge state administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong
interest in integrating those sources of law within their own system for
the proper judicial control of state officials.”171 This concern for
preserving the healthy “give and take” between state administrative
agencies and state courts certainly was not lost on the Reinhard court.
Justice Kennedy somewhat grudgingly went on to recognize,
however, that according to precedent, when a plaintiff seeks prospective
relief for an ongoing violation of federal law, sovereign immunity is not
a bar.172 He observed, however, that the Ex Parte Young exception may
not apply when the suit “would ‘upset the balance of federal and state
interests that it embodies’” because “the exception has been ‘tailored to
conform as precisely as possible to those situations in which it is
necessary to vindicate federal rights.’”173 Writing for the majority,
Kennedy then found that the Tribe’s suit implicated Idaho’s “special
sovereignty interests” and, therefore, Ex Parte Young should not apply.174
Idaho had a sovereign interest in its lands and waters which were
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Id. at 276.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 277. Presumably, Kennedy went on to decide the case
within the Ex Parte Younger framework because he could not get a majority of the
justices to agree that the Ex Parte Young exception was simply not applicable. The
majority, thus, had occasion to articulate another limitation to the exception.
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Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986)).
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Id. at 280, 287–88.
169

2010]

CLOSING THE GAP

251

implicated in the suit.175 Intrusion into such a sacred area of state
sovereignty would be for more offensive than any retroactive award of
damages that the Court had prohibited in Edelman.176 Thus, a majority
of the Court recognized that even where a plaintiff seeks prospective
relief for an ongoing violation of federal law, Ex Parte Young may be
inapplicable if the suit implicates special sovereignty interests which are
within the state’s traditional sphere of control. Moreover, a plurality of
the Court recognized that state courts have special interests in
adjudicating disputes centering on administrative law. The Court of
Appeals recognized both of these limits to sovereign immunity in
Reinhard, and grounded its decision on both of them.
While the Supreme has yet to expound further on the special
sovereignty interests that it identified in Coeur d’Alene, multiple circuit
courts of appeals have weighed in as to precisely which state functions fit
into this category. In ANR Pipeline Co. v. LaFaver, the Tenth Circuit
determined that a state “has a special and fundamental interest in its tax
collection system” that lies at the “core of state sovereignty.”177 Indeed,
the court posited that a state would cease to exist without the power to
tax.178 Therefore, the plaintiff-appellants could not bring suit against
state officials in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of unequal
The relief sought—recertification of the state’s tax
taxation.179
assessments—would be “‘fully as intrusive’ into the state’s sovereignty
as would be a retroactive money judgment against excessive property
taxes.”180 Thus, tax collection has been deemed to fall into this limited
category.
The Fourth Circuit took a more narrow approach to special
sovereignty interests in Antrican v. Carmen. In that case, particularly
applicable in Reinhard, the court determined that a “‘state’s interest in
administering a welfare program at least partially funded by the federal
government is not such a core sovereign interest as to preclude the
application of Ex Parte Young.’”181 Therefore, sovereign immunity did
not bar claims by Medicaid recipients alleging failure by state officials to
comply with the Medicaid Act.182 Judge Payne cited to Antrican for the
175

Id. at 287.
Id. at 287–88.
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Id. at 1182–85.
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Id. at 1194 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2043).
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Antrican v. Carmen, 290 F.3d 178, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting J.B. ex rel.
Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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proposition that sovereign immunity did not bar VOPA’s claim because
the state had no special state interest in the administration of the
advocacy system.183 He averred that only functions that are “uniquely
the state’s concern” such as fiscal matters may qualify as special
sovereignty interests.184 Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiff was a
state agency did not affect this determination.185 The issue and not the
identity of the party counts. The Court of Appeals, however, found that
the “nature of the party making the claim” made all the difference
because VOPA’s identity as a state agency “implicated the state’s
interest in keeping its internal authority intact.”186 Thus, while control
over a partially federally funded welfare program might not have
constituted a core sovereign interest, freedom from interference in a legal
battle between state agencies was. The identity of the plaintiff as a state
agency fundamentally changed the nature of the litigation. Virginia had a
special sovereignty interest in settling its own internecine disputes
without federal interference. In sum, as shown above, the anticommandeering principles incorporated into the sovereign immunity
doctrine and the special sovereignty interest in keeping state authority
intact form the basis of Reinhard. The next section considers whether
the theory underlying Reinhard withstands scrutiny. Moreover, it
addresses what will be foremost in the minds of many—the practical
consequences of Reinhard for administrative law.
ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S EXTENSION OF THE ALDEN AND
COEUR D’ALENE RATIONALES TO LIMIT EX PARTE YOUNG
The Reinhard decision clearly presents major implications for
both the law of sovereign immunity and administrative law. By making
application of Ex Parte Young depend in part on the identity of the party
bringing suit, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals further narrowed a
frequent exception to the sovereign immunity bar. This may become the
most recent trend in the continuing revival of the limitations inherent in
federalism. Moreover, Reinhard, for all intents and purposes, closes off
a means for state administrative agencies charged with protecting federal
rights to secure state compliance with federal law and to fulfill their
statutory functions. Private parties may still attempt to enforce federal
statutory rights against recalcitrant state administrative agencies. Such
enforcement, however, raises the specter of standing problems in cases
183
184
185
186

Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922 at *18–19.
Id. at *16–17.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *27.
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like Reinhard where the agency arguably did not deprive the individual
beneficiary of anything. Moreover, for obvious reasons, the beneficiaries
of such federal welfare programs may not have the resources or the
wherewithal to bring suit against state agencies. Alden did acknowledge
that the federal government could bring suit against the states to “‘take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”187 Therefore, the government
can bring suit in parens patriae to vindicate the federal rights of such
individuals. The federal government, however, has limited resources
which it will use sparingly and strategically and will not be able to
vindicate the rights of every citizen in every case.188 Reinhard, thus
raises the danger that federal regulatory schemes which require the
participation and cooperation of the states will go unenforced. Given
these potential consequences, two questions become important: whether
the Court of Appeals had a sound basis for its holding; and what the
actual impact of its holding will be.
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Alden and Coeur d’Alene
Principles
The Reinhard rationale appears somewhat amorphous and
difficult to grasp. The Court of Appeals appeared to exhibit a strong
aversion to federal adjudication of an internal struggle among state
agencies. The reasons for this aversion, however, seem unclear from the
opinion. The Court of Appeals relied largely on the principles
announced in Alden and stated that allowing the suits to go forward
would raise political accountability problems.189 It becomes necessary,
however, to delve beneath such surface rhetoric and determine the state
sovereignty interests and principles of dual sovereignty that the Court of
Appeals sought to protect. In full view of these essential structural
postulates, the Reinhard decision constitutes a sound, logical
development in the emerging federalism jurisprudence.
Several potential criticisms of Reinhard deserve attention. From
one perspective, Reinhard appears to be a misapplication of the
accountability rationale in Alden. The Alden Court based its holding on
the premise that allowing Congress to authorize suits for money damages
in state courts pursuant to Article I would endanger political
accountability by displacing elected state branches as the policy-
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Alden, 527 U.S. at 755–56 (quoting U.S. CONST., ART. II § 3).
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makers.190 In so doing, Congress was essentially requiring the states to
pay out money by circumventing the political process and opening up the
courts to private claims. This is an example of creating federal rights and
then requiring the states to do “the dirty work,” a practice denounced in
the anti-commandeering cases. Reinhard applied this same prohibition
against interference in state internal processes to a struggle between state
administrative agencies in federal court.
The stakes in Reinhard, however, were arguably somewhat
different. First, because VOPA was proceeding under Ex Parte Young
and not congressional abrogation, it could not seek retrospective relief
for money damages under the Edelman holding.191 Therefore, the
allocation of scarce resources so central to the political process arguably
was not implicated. Moreover, Congress had not attempted to subject
nonconsenting states to suit for this purpose. Reinhard was not a
situation in which Congress created a costly regulatory scheme and then
opened up the state courts to private suits to force states to pay up and
thus avoid the wrath of their constituents. On the contrary, the federal
government had provided funds to the states for the very purpose of
enforcing the regulatory scheme. Therefore, the states would not have
had to pay out additional funds and bear the burden of explaining such
expenditures to their citizens. In addition, because the suit was brought
in federal court and not state court, a state branch would not be forced
into service against its own state counterpart. From this perspective,
therefore, Reinhard misapplied the political accountability principles
underlying Alden.
These potential criticisms of Reinhard, however, ignore some of
the more subtle considerations necessary in our system of dual
federalism. These considerations demonstrate that Reinhard rested on a
sound basis. The mere fact that money was not at stake in Reinhard does
not end concerns as to accountability. Actions for injunctive relief under
Ex Parte Young may burden state budgets to a comparable degree as
actions for money damages.192 Although requiring the state officials to
turn over the records at issue in Reinhard may have been relatively
inexpensive, other actions against state agencies under Ex Parte Young
could result in injunctions to institute complex distribution or grievance
procedures. Complying with such procedures could require expenditure
of additional funds from the state fisc, which would incur the wrath of
state citizens. Thus, accountability is not wholly absent in the Ex Parte
190
191
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Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664–66.
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Young scenario confronted in Reinhard. Moreover, as the Court of
Appeals suggested, the source of relief for state citizens in the wake of an
unpopular decision by a federal court is unclear. Presumably, the
citizens would have to lobby Congress to repeal the relevant provisions.
As the Court seemed to recognize in New York and Printz, however,
many citizens may direct their dissatisfaction at the state representatives
who tax them for compliance with the court’s mandate. This potential
for confusion of lines of federal and state accountability appeared to be a
significant factor underlying the Reinhard decision.
While in this case, Congress did not attempt to subject
nonconsenting states to suit in federal courts through abrogation, the
reality is that it need not do so to expose states to suit. At least one
commentator has recognized that even if Congress does not abrogate,
individuals can circumvent that bar and still enforce the relevant federal
law through an Ex Parte Young action.193 If Ex Parte Young constitutes
an available exception in the face of an ongoing violation of federal law
even when Congress has not expressly abrogated, then the efficacy of the
sovereign immunity bar appears subject to significant doubt. The Court
of Appeals, therefore, may have thought of Reinhard as closing a breach
in the sovereign immunity wall, preventing the federal government from
forcing the states to shoulder costly burdens by more subtle means than
abrogation or waiver. Reinhard puts teeth into sovereign immunity.
In addition, the Court of Appeals may have silently been taking a
play from Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision in Coeur d’Alene. As
discussed above, in that case, Justice Kennedy posited that interpretation
and application of federal law governing state administrative agencies
should be left to the states so that states can tailor the law to their own
unique needs and interests.194 In this way, state judiciaries can weave
pertinent federal law into their own states’ administrative law and
mitigate the often constrictive “one-size-fits-all” nature of federal
legislation.195 For this reason, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may
have deemed it appropriate to divert such claims into state court where
judges would be more in touch with state interests.
Some might argue that this reasoning disregards the compelling
federal interests in the promotion of equality which prompt Congress to
pass laws like the DDA and the PAIMIA in the first place. An obvious
riposte to this argument, however, is that if such federal interests are
193
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sufficiently compelling to warrant vindication in a federal court, then
Congress may accomplish that end by explicitly abrogating sovereign
immunity in the statute or securing valid waiver. Indeed, such a
requirement would help ensure that only truly compelling federal
interests jealously guarded and promoted by Congress according to its
Fourteenth Amendment powers would overcome lesser state interests.
The prospect of diverting state administrative agencies’ federal
causes of action into state courts raises another concern—whether state
courts would even be obligated to adjudicate such cases. The fear arises
as to whether state agencies could vindicate federal rights at all absent
express abrogation or waiver due to state courts’ refusal to hear the cases
and enforce federal law. As discussed above, Testa v. Katt prohibits
state courts from discriminating against federal causes of action absent a
valid excuse.196 Alden held, however, that Congress lacks power under
Article I to compel states to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought
against them without their consent.197 Therefore, the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized that Testa does not require state courts to
adjudicate claims that would implicate the state’s sovereign immunity
interests.198 The question thus arises whether a state court must
adjudicate a federal claim brought by a state agency against another state
agency since such a case arguably violates sovereign immunity. The
Fourth Circuit correctly recognized, however, that these fears prove
illusory. First, the Supreme Court has held that if a state statute waives
sovereign immunity in comparable actions under state law, then it
essentially discriminates against the federal cause of action in violation
of Testa.199 The Court has emphasized that the Supremacy Clause
prohibits state court refusal to enforce of federal law because of
disagreement with its content.200 In Alden, the Court suggested that a
state court may not “manipulate[] its immunity in systematic fashion to
discriminate against federal causes of action.”201 Alden, therefore, did
not simply eliminate the Testa holding whenever a federal cause of
action implicates state sovereign immunity. State courts may only refuse
to hear federal questions on the basis of a neutral rule of judicial
administration such as discouraging frivolous claims.202 Therefore, state
196
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198
199
200
201
202
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courts could not refuse to hear a federal claim by a state agency against
another state agency out of mere disagreement with the content or
policies embodied in the federal law. Rather, if a state waives sovereign
immunity for comparable state law claims, it must do the same for
federal claims.
Furthermore, a suit by a state agency against another state
agency in state court arguably does not implicate sovereign immunity
because the special sovereign interest underlying Reinhard is not present.
The Fourth Circuit found that federal adjudication of the claim
“implicated the state’s interest in keeping its internal authority intact.”203
In other words, only the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an
intramural dispute between state agencies constituted the violation of
state sovereign immunity. When a state court adjudicates such a claim,
however, the state’s internal authority remains intact because the federal
court does not referee the contest. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s
assurance that state courts remain open to such suits proves wellfounded. Indeed, the both parties in Reinhard conceded that VOPA
could have brought its claims in state court.204 The Court of Appeals
explicitly confirmed that Testa would require state courts to hear such
claims.205
As a final consideration, some might argue that the Fourth
Circuit misperceived the conflict between VOPA and DMHMRAS,
CVTC, and CHS. Unlike other administrative agencies, VOPA’s
primary function is to advocate for third parties—the recipients of mental
health services.206 Therefore, the conflict in Reinhard arguably was not
one between two state administrative agencies for power and resources.
Rather, the conflict arguably was between state government caregivers—
DMHRAS, the CVTX, and CHS—and the mental health patients to
whom they had a duty under federal law. Under this conception, VOPA
was serving as an advocate for the private patients’ interests and not for
its own institutional interests. Therefore, the internecine political
struggle perceived by the Fourth Circuit was illusory, and the contest
really boils down to one by private individuals against state agencies for
ongoing violations of federal law.207 This conception fits neatly into the
203
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Ex Parte Young paradigm and is far less intrusive of state sovereign
immunity.
Such a fine and imperceptible line as whose interests are really at stake,
however, would prove extremely difficult to apply in practice. Many, if
not most, administrative agencies advocate for or at least, act for the
benefit of individual third parties. Moreover, the efficacy with which an
administrative agency serves the interests of third parties will often
determine that agency’s share of resources and power. Therefore,
conflicts between state agencies cannot be neatly divided into those for
scarce resources and those brought solely to vindicate the rights of third
parties. Such a test would prove exceedingly difficult to apply and
would undermine the simplicity and predictability of the Reinhard rule.
Although such a bright line rule may appear to frustrate Congress’ intent
to protect third party rights, Congress is hardly without recourse.
As discussed further below, Congress may explicitly abrogate
state sovereign immunity or secure valid waiver in exchange for federal
resources. In addition, the state courts remain available forums for state
agencies to vindicate federal rights. In sum, Reinhard is simply a
natural extension of the prevailing sovereign immunity jurisprudence,
aimed at maintaining political accountability, preserving the dignity of
the states, and giving states the necessary leeway to adapt federal law to
their unique needs. The decision rests on the solid theoretical bases of
ensuring political accountability and preserving the sovereign interests of
the states. Nevertheless, many doubtless find the potential consequences
of Reinhard—inability to vindicate federal rights—exceedingly
troublesome.
B. The Consequences of the Reinhard Decision
As discussed above, the Court of Appeals was quick to point out
that state administrative agencies could bring suit against the states
provided Congress either abrogated sovereign immunity by unmistakable
language or expressly conditioned receipt of federal resources on waiver
of sovereign immunity.208 Thus, the court appeared almost to reassure
VOPA and state agencies similarly situated that all was not lost. As long
as Congress includes unmistakable language to the effect that sovereign
immunity does not apply, then the wall comes down and the federal
The Court of Appeals disposes of this argument by finding that “federal law must be
applied ‘in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States.’” Id.
(quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 732). Therefore, although it did not address the contention in
any great detail, it clearly did not find it persuasive.
208
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courts are open to suits by state agencies against the states. The decision,
therefore, to a significant extent simply punts the ball to Congress. In the
waiver context, if Congress passes laws that offer the states federal funds
to create particular administrative agencies or perform certain functions,
it can easily incorporate language which makes acceptance of the federal
gift or gratuity contingent on waiving immunity to suit. Congress can
extract such a waiver under any of its Article I powers. Thus, federal
courts will always be open to suits against states by state administrative
agencies if Congress offers conditional funding in the enabling statute.
At least one commentator has predicted that such conditional waiver will
increase dramatically in the future precisely because of the narrowing of
Ex Parte Young and the abrogation power.209 In addition, although the
Supreme Court has determined that the abrogation power under Section 5
is not unlimited, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity by
statute provided the statute is congruent and proportional to the goals of
the Fourteenth Amendment.210 In Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, for instance the Court upheld Congressional
abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Family and Medical Leave
Act.211 Reinhard does little more than place the ball firmly in Congress’
court.
In addition, as discussed above, even absent congressional
abrogation or waiver, state agencies are not left without recourse for the
enforcement of federal rights. Rather, under Testa, the Supremacy
Clause compels state courts to adjudicate federal questions and enforce
federal rights. Sovereign immunity does not afford state courts a valid
excuse to refuse jurisdiction because under Reinhard, only federal
adjudication of a conflict between state agencies violates sovereign
immunity. As Justice Kennedy averred in Coeur d’Alene and the Fourth
Circuit confirmed in Reinhard, state courts are perfectly competent to
adjudicate such federal questions. In addition, the states have an interest
in interpreting and applying federal law when it relates to state
administrative law. In such a context, states may effectively resolve
conflicts between federal laws and their own, and interpret and apply
federal law so as not to frustrate the unique policy goals of the state. In
209
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sum, the actual impact on state administrative agencies’ enforcement of
federal regulatory schemes likely will be minimal.
CONCLUSION
Reinhard marks a legal crossroads on a number of levels. On
one level it is the crossroads between Ex Parte Young and the anticommandeering principles incorporated into the Supreme Court’s
sovereign immunity jurisprudence in Alden. On another level, it
represents the cross-roads between the law of sovereign immunity and
administrative law. Reinhard narrows the means by which state
administrative agencies may secure state compliance with the federal
scheme which they discharge. State agencies must resort to other
avenues to secure such compliance. Ultimately, however, it will be up to
Congress to take responsibility for such enforcement and either abrogate
or secure state consent to suit.

